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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the discussion which follows is to clarify the roles of fishers 
organizations in coastal fisheries management. Even if there is much 
disagreement over the appraisal of fishers organizations, whatever the type of 
intermediary organizations will be expected to entail sharing-responsibility 
between government and fishers. A cooperative system is applicable to co­
management and community-based management regimes. Cooperative 
movement in Thai fisheries has not yet been mature enough to expand their 
activities into fisheries management. Nowadays, however, much effort has 
been made to create a new framework of promotion policy for fishers 
organizations by the Thai government. Experiences gained in Thailand will 
give a profound insight into a direction of fishers organization in sustainable 
fisheries management.
1. Introduction
1.1 Objectives
Decentralization of fisheries management is a key concept in new regimes, 
placing great emphasis on the encouragement of fishers' participation in the 
management. Policy makers, administrators and fishers recognize a pressing need to 
set up a particular type of fishers organization that functions as a management body at 
local level. The major purpose of this paper is to discuss the organizational structure 
and operation principles of the organizations.
The first part of this paper will briefly review, from a management aspect, the 
framework of new approaches to small-scale fisheries development. The second part 
will clarify the roles of intermediary organizations that entail sharing-responsibility 
between government and fishers. This part will also present a general view of 
cooperative-governance of fisheries resources. In the third part, the focal point will be 
on the development of fishers organizations currently existing in Thailand. There is 
considerable disagreement, not only in Thailand but also elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
over whether or not traditional cooperative organizations could be transformed into 
effective management bodies. This becomes a controversial issue. This part will first
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examine the substantial reasons of disagreement through experiences gained in 
Thailand. It will also examine a new framework of promotion policy for fishers 
organizations that the Thai government has just set up. The final part will conclude 
the perspective and direction of fishers organizations in coastal fisheries management.
1.2 Background
The Southeast Asian nations have rapidly expanded commercial fisheries and 
fisheries-based industries during the last three decades. The introduction and 
expansion of highly productive technologies have brought a rapid increase in 
production. A strong inducement to urge the development of commercial fisheries 
come primarily from an ever-increasing foreign demand for highly valuable species. 
The expansion of domestic consumption has become another important factor in the 
realization of a high growth rate of fisheries and fisheries-based industries. As a 
result, the industries have successfully increased their contribution to the national 
economy, providing a wide variety of employment opportunities.
However, too rapid a development of commercial fisheries has caused several 
contradictions. Under government-centered control over marine resources, fishers 
have enthusiastically increased their catch effort in fishing open-access resources. 
Profitable fishing business attracts newcomers and provides high employment. Local 
overcapitalization and overfishing are widespread throughout the country. Severe 
competition has occurred not only between large-scale and small-scale fishers but 
also local internecine problems within the small-scale fishing groups. Unequal of 
distribution of marine resource has become a serious social problem. Poverty 
alleviation cannot yet be achieved. Deteriorating coastal environments and depletion 
of marine resources have caused a crisis in fishing communities for their survival in 
economic and social terms. The Government's 'long-sighted' policy for fisheries 
management may often give a sense of hopelessness to poor small-scale fishers 
(Chong, K., 1994). Even if policy is directed towards the sustainable use of marine 
resources, its implementation will sometime endanger social stability and then 
become a political controversy.
It is obvious that narrowly focused policy for improving production of small- 
scale fisheries cannot solve dilemmas that fishers face. Governments, development 
agencies and NGOs organize many comprehensive programs which are designed to 
sustain economic and social stability in fishing communities. Establishment of 
effective management with participatory approaches is the most essential in the 
implementation of the programs.
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2. Framework of Effective Management and Concept of Participatory
Approaches
2.1 Towards Effective Management
Governments of Southeast Asian nations have so far made great efforts to 
structure the hierarchy of fisheries management. However, from the top-down 
approaches have often failed in gaining fishers' response and support. They scorn 
government control over their fishing activities, regarding it as bureaucratic and 
ineffective. They are excluded from the decision-making process of fisheries 
management. Restrictions on destructive fishing activities have little effect. Small- 
scale fishers stand in a vulnerable position relative to large-scale ones. They equip 
fishing boats with highly productive fishing gear and often invade restricted or 
preserved areas for small-scale fishers. Coastal fisheries resources, even today, are 
virtually open-access.
Government-centered regimes of fisheries management in Southeast Asia 
have found a difficulty in sustaining the stable use of coastal resources. The regimes 
have hardly attained equal distribution among fishers, although commercial fisheries 
have rapidly developed. Governments have increased their authority in fisheries 
management whilst local control, through traditional management and custom, has 
correspondingly diminished (Nielse, R. N. & Vedsmand, T. 1995). Pomeroy refers to 
the misleading "standard-package" approach to fisheries development, which neglects 
the mixed nature of small-scale fishers and their great diversity depending upon their 
functions (Pomeroy, R. S., 1991).»
being regarded as an adequate measure to fit in with local conditions. A fishery 
cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation of fishers in any process of 
making laws and regulations (Pomeroy, R. S. & Williams, M.J., 1994).
Decentralization of a government-centered regime is indispensable for the 
establishment of user-based resource management in coastal fisheries. This regime 
often faces a difficulty in enforcing fisheries laws and regulations due to lack of a 
workable administrative system, personnel and budget. The procedure of 
decentralization has several advantages. Firstly, fishers' indigenous knowledge of 
coastal fisheries resources is of great use in the enforcement of conservation measures 
being suited to local conditions. Secondly, their participation and cooperation in a 
sustainable management regime is cost-effective rather than the traditional from the 
top-down approach. Thirdly, local communities and people may be able to administer 
regulatory institutions that are superior to externally-imposed regulations (Townsend, 
R.E., 1995).
As many anthropological studies indicate, traditional community-based 
fisheries management used to have self-governing functions in using land and coastal 
resources within a well-defined narrow locality. Akimichi points out that the 
traditional marine fisheries tenure and its administration depend heavily on such 
distinct conditions as low population density, homogeneity of kin- or territorially-
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based communities, use of primitive technologies, isolation from urban fish markets 
(Akimichi, T. , 1995). Fishers and residents arrange a particular type of informal 
institution with self- and mutual-help functions enabling them to survive. 
Communities often have a "shared-poverty" function, too. They share same cultural 
backgrounds.
Jentoft theoretically describes that a traditional community-based fisheries 
management represents an institutional arrangement for mutual adjustment among 
fishers within a certain defined area (Jentoft, S. & Kristoffersen, T., 1989). This 
arrangement is informal. Initiatives of fisheries management belong to fishers and 
local residents, not to any authority of central government. Of course, traditional 
systems cannot always evolve into formal ones. Influenced by an infiltrating 
commercial economy, traditional communities have diminished the function of 
governing common property in their immediate vicinity. Moreover, government- 
centered regimes have increasingly threatened the survival of traditional community- 
based fisheries management. Local government control over fishing activities and 
coastal resources is spreading throughout the country, as Bailey and Zerner analyze 
‘sasi’  systems in Indonesia (Bailey, C. & Zerner, C., 1991).
Regardless of whether or not a community-based fisheries management could 
be transformed into formal and institutional ones, traditional experiences and 
customs may provide a profound insight into what viable model of institution will be 
more suited to people's self-governance of coastal fisheries resources. There may be a 
wide variety of models whereby fishers participate in the decision-making process of 
fisheries management. Co-management and/or community-based models are the ones 
that transfer government-centered powers to the local level.
2.2 Participatory Approach and Co-management
It is widely acknowledged that co-management represents a particular 
partnership between government and local fishers (communities, and institutions): of 
course, there are some disagreements over the detailed concepts of co-management. 
The partnership shares responsibility and the authority of fisheries management 
between both parties (Pomeroy, R. S. & Williams, M. J., 1994; McCay, B. J. , 1993). 
This is expected to develop an institutional framework which stimulates fishers to 
participate in the decision-making process of management.
A framework of co-management contains the ideal of decentralization and 
deofficialization. On the other hand, it sets up intermediary institutions which are 
legally controlled by government. This seems a contradiction. A traditional 
community-based fisheries management might not be applicable to the creation of a 
new regime without legitimacy. Government-centered regimes have found a difficulty 
to enforce fisheries restrictions in order to reduce the depletion of coastal fisheries 
resources. The co-management approach takes a middle position between 
government-centered and traditional community-based management. Obviously, the 
organization and activity of co-management is legalized by central government.
298
Within the scope of legitimacy, fishers will take self-governance of fishing activities. 
Co-management may be composed of a government-centered regime.
The question is to what extent government agencies will devolve their present 
duty of governing coastal fisheries. This is a very difficult one. Bureaucrats and 
policy makers probably hesitate to transfer their initiatives to the local level, on the 
grounds that fishers are incompetent as administrators of resources. Decisively, a 
deofficialization strategy greatly influences the whole aspect of a bureaucratic system 
including the local administration currently prevailing. It becomes a political 
controversy. Another question is what institutional framework should be designed for 
enabling small-scale fishers to take initiatives in fisheries management. It is generally 
understood that there are two substantial elements for promoting fishers' participation 
through any institutional framework; territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) and 
fishers' organizations (FOs). These elements are interlocked reciprocally.
The availability of TURFs is a prerequisite for community-based fisheries 
management, as Christy describes (Christy, F. T. , 1992). It is a central element of 
co-management (Pomeroy. R. S. & Williams, M.J., 1994). TURFs are given to 
individual fishers, groups of fishers, communities and/or local governments. They 
may be divided into territorial use rights for capture fisheries and for aquaculture. 
They are regarded as exclusive access rights to coastal fisheries. The cooperative use 
and self-governance of resources will bring efficiency and equity to those fishers 
who possess the right to entry into fisheries.
In a traditional community-based fisheries management, communal organs in 
various forms have responsibility not only for controlling production activities of 
fishers but also arranging equal distribution of resources to community members. The 
communal organs have a 'shared-poverty' function. In case studies on the ‘sasi’ 
system in Maluku Island, community's leaders and elite have little discretionary 
powers that lead to their own profit making (Kissaya, E., 1993; Mantjoro, E., 1993). 
Their management activities have legitimacy by passing through mutual consent of 
all resource users in the community. In cases where a ‘sasi’ system works effectively, 
a group of committees carefully watches fishers' law-abiding activities and guides 
them to conserve scarce resources. Any offender is punished by the group. It acts as a 
management body which coordinates among the resource users concerned and avoids 
a conflict of interest. The group extends its function within defined territorial 
boundaries. It is noteworthy that sustainable use and equitable distribution of scarce 
resource are firmly built into traditional communities.
Government and resource users jointly establish particular types of formal 
organizations, as traditional fishing communities have established communal organs. 
Their membership may be open exclusively to those fishers who have a license  and 
limited entry to coastal resources. Or the membership is open to any residents withn 
defined boundaries. In either case, the management of TURFs is a key role of  
organizations.
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FOs are communal in nature, as long as fishing communities are primary 
units for the management of TURFs. They may be attuned to the greater importance 
of communal benefit rather than individual ones. An egalitarian movement will 
reduce a large gap in terms of distribution of coastal resources among fishers. On the 
other hand, FOs show a corporate nature in organization. Under a rapid development 
of commercial fisheries, fishers have a strong will to advance in economic terms. 
Their motivation deeply affects the operational principles that FOs adopt. Fishers 
much prefer to maximize own individual benefit rather than to sustain economic 
equality among them. They are organized into a management body almost as 
competitors. In fact, many traditional fishing communities which have arranged an 
institutional framework for the sustainable use of coastal resources have gradually 
diminished the functions of avoiding social conflicts (Mantjoro, E. & Akimichi, T., 
1995).
There will appear a wide variety of forms of FOs acting as management 
bodies. The basic ideal and practical components of TURFs are the major elements 
which affect their organization and operation. While TURFs neither concern local 
intimacy nor communal cohesion of fishers, the organization of FOs entail flexibility 
and openness. They are corporate in nature, based on competitiveness and efficiency. 
These organizations will be capable of managing such as individual transferable 
quota. On the other hand, there are many obstacles to introducing TURFs.
In Southeast Asia, coastal fisheries still provide rural people with an important 
means of livelihood. Some restrictions on coastal fisheries, which are conducive to 
the sustaining of scarce resources, will make a number of fishers and their families 
face a crisis of survival. Fishers have not yet grown mature enough to adapt 
themselves to complicated management regimes. Probably, they prefer to take a 
noncommittal attitude toward determination in the management of TURFs. It is 
obvious, of course, that they need a well-defined right to determination in the 
decision-making process (Townsend, R. E., 1995). Small-scale fishers adopt 
collective measures to manage and utilize coastal fisheries resources. FOs rely on 
local and social intimacy among fishers, and then develop communal procedures of 
decision-making processes into formal democratic ones. The cooperative ideal and 
procedures of resource use are becoming the most significant.
3. Expectations and Dilemma of Fishers Organizations in Thailand
3.1 Disagreement over Promotion for Cooperative Organizations
There is a pressing need to promote cooperative organizations and encourage 
people's participation in rural development, but this is very difficult work especially 
in small-scale fisheries. As Yamao describes, even today, the appraisal of rural-based 
cooperatives has fluctuated between a negative and positive light (Yamao, M., 1993). 
In fisheries fields, there have been a plenty of failures to set up self-help 
organizations which adopt cooperative principles and manners.
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Governments in Southeast Asia have made many fresh departures in the 
creation of cooperative organizations in various forms during the last two decades. In 
Thailand, there exists at least four different types of fishers organizations: fisheries 
cooperatives, agriculturists groups for fisheries, fishers groups, and BAAC (Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives)'s clients groups. There are several 
substantial reasons for the coexistence of cooperatives and 'quasi-cooperatives.' Plural 
government agencies involved in rural development have made considerable effort to 
establish distinct types of fishers organizations according to their own objectives. 
Lack of coordination among the agencies has led to the complicated systems of 
fishers organizations. As a result, fishers' movement toward the improvement of 
cooperative activities has been divided into several sections. Promotion policy for 
cooperative organizations have always fluctuated between political and economic 
aspects, and between pessimistic and optimistic appraisal. Such changeable attitudes 
towards cooperative organizations are the major cause hindering the smooth 
development of fishers participation in whatever the type of cooperatives.
Fishers tend to regard any cooperative organizations as agencies of 
government's relief work. They often hesitate to deal with cooperative business 
activities since they have to follow complicated procedures. More decisively, the 
organizations do not cover all the aspects of production and distribution that fishers 
need. Membership of cooperative organizations are a tiny portion of all fishers in 
small-scale fisheries. Therefore, they can hardly act as conduits of government 
support to all fishers.
Naturally, promotion for fishers organizations, which is at the core of co­
management and community-based fisheries management, becomes a matter of 
controversy. However, many failures of traditional cooperative organizations remind 
policy makers and administrators that they will be little use in coastal resource 
management.
3.2 Appraisal of The Present System of Fishers Organizations in Thailand
Fisheries cooperatives (FCs), which are regulated by the Cooperative Society 
Act, l. extend their membership over a district (Amphure) and conduct economic 
activities. In actuality, they function as occupational groups whose members share the 
same interests, consisting of particular types and classes of fisheries. The 
cooperatives do not affiliate many fishers within the district. Cooperative membership 
accounts for a tiny portion of the total number of fishers, estimated at less than 10% 
of those engaged in marine capture fisheries and aquaculture in 1994. The number of 
FCs has gradually increased.
Agriculturist groups for fisheries (AGFs) ,2. are distinct in nature from FCs. 
Membership of AGFs extend over an administrative village (Tambol). It is ideal that 
they should play a key role in village development programs supported by 
government. The number of AGFs have rapidly increased after the mid-1970s, and
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surpassed that of FCs. From then onward, AGFs importantly acted as conduits of 
government subsidies and financing to fishers.
There are some reasons why government does not pay much attention to the 
rebuilding of the present system of cooperative organizations for the creation of new 
management regimes in coastal fisheries. First, both FCs and AGFs are designed to 
conduct economic activities such as provision of credit, supply of production 
materials, and marketing fisheries produce. It is not clear whether these two 
categories will be applicable to co-management and community-based management. 
Loosely defined, the category of cooperatives refers to an economic organ through 
which members would be able to grow into maturity as commercial producers. In 
contrast, the category of AGFs may be defined as social relief work of government 
(Yamao, M., 1996). In addition, BAAC's clients groups are to function with joint and 
several liabilities among a small number of clients.
Secondly, not much success has been achieved in the operation of business 
activities. Many of AGFs fell into dormancy which could have provided meaningful 
service. Depending heavily on the support of government, they failed to encourage 
people's participation on a voluntary basis. Fisheries cooperatives are not in a very 
critical condition, nevertheless they are not capable of the challenge of new assigned 
work in coastal fisheries management. Moreover, the administrative lines registering 
and supervising the cooperatives are separated from the implementation of fisheries 
policies. Without rearrangement of the administrative system, cooperatives can hardly 
adapt themselves to the management of coastal fisheries.
Thirdly, Thai government has still continued to investigate the enactment of 
the fisheries laws and regulations that do not include any framework of fishing rights 
(Karnjanakesorn, C. & Yen-eng, S., 1995). In a draft, the fishing right system means 
a decentralized system that transfers part of responsibilities for fisheries management 
to local levels. However, clear-cut outlines of the new regimes are not yet proclaimed. 
The government devotes itself to investigating fishers’ attitudes toward fishing right 
systems and preparing for pilot projects in several provinces.
Therefore, the present system of cooperative organizations will not be 
integrated with new management regimes of coastal fisheries.
3.3 New Approaches toward Community-based Organizations
After the mid-1980, the DOF began an enthusiastic involvement in the 
development programs of small-scale fishing communities. While increasing the 
capacity of extension services, it rapidly enlarged the amount of budget earmarked for 
the investment of infrastructures such as small landing places, marketing places, 
retaining walls, meeting halls, storage and other facilities for the improvement of 
production and living conditions. These are located in fishing communities, termed 
Moo Baans and/or Tambols. As Table 1 indicates, the number of projects was more 
than five hundred in coastal fisheries up to 1995. In aquaculture, fishers obtain new
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technology and knowledge of fish, shrimp, oyster, cockles and others with some 
production materials. In coastal fisheries, except for gear demonstrations, the DOF 
concentrated mainly on the construction of piers throughout the country, especially in 
Chantaburi, Trad, Surat Thani, Chumpon, Trang, and Satun. It is estimated that this 
work accounted for more than 70 % of the total budget for the development programs 
of small-scale fisheries. There were 92 piers in 1993, this then increased to 151 by 
1995. The scale of a pier is not large, being in a ratio of one to 20 or 30 fishing boats. 
The number of projects for building retaining walls increased. A great deal of budget 
was invested in the establishment of artificial reefs, also.
Such active involvement in the development of small-scale fishing 
communities may provide great incentives for fishers to improve their production and 
living conditions. No analytical data indicates how effectively community-based 
infrastructures are used. Roughly speaking, a considerable number of piers have not 
yet achieved full utilization by fishers due to unsuitable location and the inappropriate 
design of structures. The piers privately owned by fish traders may be more 
convenient for fishers to have a business link with them. As long as the traders 
diversify their economic function on these piers, they have little motivation to move 
toward the new public facilities. Meanwhile, artificial reefs are very useful not only 
for aggregating fish but also for reducing resource damage caused by trawlers. Fishers 
much appreciate the installation of artificial reefs and the creation of a new fishing 
order in their immediate fishing grounds (Shinanuwong, K., 1993) .
In the process of implementing development programs, a concerted effort has 
been made to establish a particular type of fishers organization since 1987. This is 
called "Klun Khong Tuns Pramong (group of funds for fisheries, GFF), which is 
distinguished in nature from FCs and AGFs. There existed 99 groups in 1993: at 
present, the total number of groups is more than 170. The membership of a GFF tends 
to extend mainly over Moo Baans which are primary units of an administrative 
village (Tambol). It is designed to work as an agent of the fisheries extension service 
and to undertake the task of managing community-based infrastructures. Those 
fishers joining the membership can have access to training courses organized by the 
extension service and gain some economic benefit. In cases where fishers do not 
organize themselves into a group, they set up a committee for the collective use of the 
infrastructures only.
Depending on the concessive support of government, GFFs perform some 
economic activities, especially the supply of fishing gears on credit. In a Moo Baan, 
Klongyai District, Trad Province, fishers are engaged mainly in small-scale trawl 
fisheries, gill net and trap fisheries. In 1991, 41 fishers (40% of the total number of 
fishing households) joined together to set up a GFF. The DOF constructed a small 
pier while the district administration replaced the wooden walkway along the canal by 
the concrete one. The GFF began with the supply of nets on credit while it was 
assigned to manage the pier. At the outset, the DOF subsidized a great portion of the 
operating funds. A share capital is one hundred Baht. Interest is charged 2 Baht per 
one hundred Baht for short-term credit, on a monthly basis (Yamao, M., 1995).
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Table 1 Development Programs for Small-scale Fisheries (. 987-1995)
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Aquaculture 1) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 8 2 6 1 1 11 18 8 13 9 2 86
Coastal Fisheries 2) 2 1 15 23 26 16 40 11 11 10 26 28 28 48 17 30 51 0 50 30 11 31 505
Pier 2 1 5 10 11 5 8 6 6 3 9 7 12 11 8 9 7 0 13 13 1 4 151
Retaining Wall 0 0 1 4 3 3 6 2 2 2 4 4 2 5 2 5 2 0 6 8 2 3 66
Storage 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 2 2 3 0 2 6 0 3 2 2 1 30
Processing Plants 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 12
Water Tank 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 3 3 1 0 15
Winch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Artificial Reef 0 0 6 0 1 0 11 0 0 2 1 2 0 12 7 5 5 0 7 9 0 9 77
Gear Demonstration 0 1 2 8 8 7 13 3 1 3 8 12 11 15 17 8 27 0 17 15 3 12 191
Processing 3) 0 0 3 3 7 2 3 2 0 1 2 7 5 5 1 1 12 6 9 14 7 6 96
Note 1) This is promotion for aquaculture o f fish, shrimp, oyster, cockle, mussel and so on.
2) These are mainly construction projects.
3) These are for extension of technology, training, and marketing.
(Source) DOF Phun Thi Dam Naan Kan Khlongkan Phattana Pramong Tale Chai Phan Phun Baan Phi 2530-2538
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In another fishing community of the Klongyai District, a GFF supplies gill 
nets on credit. Fishers are engaged mainly in gill net fishing for crab, shrimp and 
giant queen fish. The upper limit of credit is 4,000 Baht per person. Duration of 
repayment is ten months. The members require two persons to stand joint and several 
security. As the amount of credit is not enough, they have to provide a certain portion 
of the money for purchasing gill nets. This GFF has not accumulated their own 
capital, so that the members have to wait for their turn to obtain credit. Interest 
payments of borrowers are the major source of profit. It would appear that the 
scarcity of operating funds has become an impediment to a further encouragement of 
fishers' participation.
Table 2 shows some indicative figures of GFFs' activities in Trang Province: 
no available data indicates the whole aspect of GFFs throughout the country. 
Compared with other provinces bordering the Gulf of Thailand, the establishment of 
GFFs was started at a much slower pace. For the last few years, fishers have 
increasingly participated in GFFs' activities. The scale of membership per group is 
very small, being 40 fishers on average. Such a meager scale results from the fact that 
GFFs are established mainly within a Moo Baan(s). The membership of GFFs do not 
include all fishers in their immediate vicinity, although there is a great difference in 
percentage of members to all fishers between GFFs. It ranges from 20 to 90 %, but 
many groups are at a level of 30 %. A GFF is characterized as a community-based 
institution. However, membership is not open to any fishers on account of a lack of 
operating funds. As a result, GFFs do not always represent communal interests. They 
follow the motivation of individual benefits among particular interest groups.
GFFs concentrate mainly on the provision of fishing gear on credit in the 
operation of business activities, not diversifying their function. This is not only 
because they are not regarded as economic organizations, but also because they have 
not yet accumulated their own assets. The total value of assets is 112,817 Baht per 
group. The funds subsidized by the DOF account for 92.5 % of the total on average. 
GFFs would hardly conduct any economic activities without government support. 
Some groups decrease the amount of supply year by year. They mediate government 
subsidies to members as intermediaries. Further development of business activities is 
very difficult work.
The figures of Table 2 prove that GFFs are of no great use for managing and 
maintaining community-based infrastructures, nor are they helpful to the DOF to 
expand new technology and ideas that are conducive to a rapid improvement of 
fisheries production. However, many attempts and experiences gained in the 
operation of GFFs are highly suggestive to the perspective and direction of fishers 
organizations. The next section will focus on what viable models are desirable for 
attaining a participatory approach in coastal fisheries management.
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Table 2 Organization and Operation o f Groups o f Funds fo r F isheries (GFFs) in Trang Province
Unit: No., %, Baht
Year of 
Establishment
No. of 
Household
No. of 
Members %
Total 
Assets 2)
Subsidies 
from DOF
Shares Savings Profit Supply of 
Materials 3)
Budget for Infrastructure 
Pier Others 4)
Paliam District
1 1993 138 101 73.20% 147,955 136,384 11,571 20,634 2,143,200
2 1995 114 24 21.10% 71,630 68,630 700 68,630
3 1995 74 28 37.80% 95,790 83,030 2,000 32,400 5,065 83,030
Sikao District
1 1994 112 38 33.90% 133,894 116,050 4,400 8,130 3,982 48,230
2 1989 119 31 26.10% 92,878 92,878 500,000
3 1994 40 35 87.50% 113,092 107,231 38,391 1,098,400
Kantan District
1 1993 73 66 90.40% 140,223 129,831 5,213 22,200
2 1993 167 37 22.20% 131,200 125,424 1,700 2,499 21,450
3 1994 200 38 19.00% 133,894 116,050 4,400 8,130 3,982 48,230 4,114,000
4 1994 151 32 21.20% 91,580 84,280 2,800 4,500 84,280 576,000
5 1995 63 25 39.70% 125,972 117,449 7,570 95 43,470 278,000
Khosanene Sub-district
1 1995 170 20 11.80% 75,700 74,500 500 600 74,500
(Per Group) 118 40 33.90% 112,817 104,311 3,184 46,087
Note 1) Total of GFFs is 18 which does not include the groups with numbers of members.
2) Figures are as of 1995.
3) Amount of supply is almost equivalent that of credits.
4) These are the budgets of the DOF.
(Source) Kijkaam Khong Kan Phatana Pramong Tale Chai Phang Phun Baan Yokuen Kan Jat San Leng Asai Sat Tale Khon Changwat Trang 
DOF, 1995
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4. The Creation of Fishers Organizations as Management Bodies
4.1 Lessons from Past and Present Experience
Three types of cooperative organizations in Thai fisheries have their own 
profiles, shown in Table 3. FCs would hardly evolve into a management body for 
coastal fisheries without any coordination with fisheries agencies. The organization 
and membership of some fisheries cooperatives are fitted to highly commercialized 
fisheries. These cooperatives always have a strong will to expand their scale of 
business. They are likely to expand business scale and integrate those fishers who 
have the same economic interests into cooperative membership beyond their 
immediate vicinity. Economic inducement is obviously an essential element in 
enhancing cooperation among members. Some cooperatives are affiliated mainly with 
small-scale fishers, in the same way as other types of FOs. They are local-based 
organizations. However, membership and operation are flexible, and distinct from 
AGFs and GFFs. To grow into adequate institutions involved in coastal fisheries 
management, FCs must be divided into new categories in the regulations. In addition, 
FCs have been alienated from favor in fisheries policies.
In principle, AGFs have adequate profiles and principles as community-based 
organizations. They are established within Tambols, consisting of several fishing 
communities (Moo Baans). A Tambol is a primary unit of Thai local administration 
with some budgetary and administrative powers, under the authority of the district 
and takes a key role in recent rural development projects. Standing between the 
district directly authorized by government and the Moo Baans managed by local 
residents, Tambol administration has a function of coordinating people and 
government. It is a formal institution in which the residents participate in the 
decision-making process of administration. AGFs (and whatever the type of 
agriculturist groups) are designed to entail social intimacy among members within the 
Tambol. The organizational structure of AGFs may be more attuned to the 
importance of sustaining a sense of political unity than that of attaining economic 
efficiency in business operation. Such Tambol-based organizations might have taken 
an initiative in co-management regimes. In actuality, a number of AGFs have fallen 
into dormancy sine the mid-1980s.
Generally speaking, GFFs extend their membership within a very narrow 
locality. The scale of membership is not large. Probably, the meager scale of 
membership may be better suited to the implementation of extension services, but not 
to the operation of any economic activities. It is regarded as primary unit of coastal 
management. Small-scale fishers normally cover a wider area of fishing ground 
beyond their immediate vicinity. As seen in a pilot project for community-based 
management in Tambol Khaomaikeew, Trang Province, fishers living in six Moo 
Baans set up an area federation a few years ago. The federation has responsibility for 
coordinating among Moo Baans and creating a self-governance regime in certain 
fishing grounds. Interlocking relationships between the Moo Baans have enabled a 
restriction on destructive fishing methods and gear such as trawl and push nets and
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Table 3 Distinct Profiles of Three Types of Fishers Organizations in Thailand
Laws & Regulations Under Authority Government 
Audit 1)
Area of Mem­
bership
Main Activities Nature of 
organization
Status Flexibility Conditions for participating in management
Fisheries Cooperatives 
(FCs)
Cooperative Society 
Act (in 1968)
Cooperative Promotion 
Department
(Ministry of Agriculture & 
Cooperatives)
Yes District Supply, Credits, 
Deposit, Marketing
Economic orga­
nization
Active Yes Yes
Expansion of membership. Rearrangement of 
primary units. Creation of new categories according 
to members' fisheries. Coordination with DOF.
Agriculturists Groups 
for Fisheries 
(AGFs)
Revolutionary Proclamation 
No. 140 & No. 141 
(in 1972)
Department of Fisheries 
(Ministry of Agriculture & 
Cooperatives)
Yes Tambol
(administrative
village)
Supply. Credits, 
Deposit, Marketing
Economic orga­
nization
Agents of govern­
ment agencies
Not active 
(many are 
dormant)
No No
Some active groups may be transformed into 
management bodies.
Group of Funds for 
Fisheries (GFFs)
Notification of Depart­
ment of Fisheries
Department of Fisheries 
(Ministry of Agriculture & 
Cooperatives)
No Mainly Moo 
Baan
(primary unit 
village)
Supply of gears 
Management of 
Infrastructures 
Extension of tech­
nology
Conduits of exten­
sion service
Active Yes Yes
Expansion of membership. Encouragement of fishers 
autonomy. Reduction of dependence on supports. 
Rebuilt organizational structure. Establishment of 
regional federations.
Notes 1) Government audit is conducted by the Department of Cooperative Auditing (Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives).
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preserves the marine environment in their fishing grounds. It is obvious that 
individual GFFs will join the membership of an area federation which has a co­
management function at local level.
Meanwhile, as long as GFFs are engaged in some economic activities, a 
considerable proportion of fishers are excluded from their membership. They limit 
newcomers. A shortage of operating funds becomes an obstacle. GFFs are more 
economic organizations in nature than generally thought, although the scale of 
activities is meager. Some fishers can access government support, while others are 
alienated from it. Community-based organizations such as GFFs do not always have 
communal and majority benefits. Therefore, administrative organs of Moo Baans or 
Tambols may be more applicable to the establishment of co-management and 
community-based fisheries management having special attention to equality and 
people's participation.
4.2 Equality, Democratic Control and Competition
As Table 3 indicates, there should be some preconditions for transforming the 
fishers organizations as they currently prevail into management bodies in coastal 
fisheries. It seems that FOs would be better if they specialized their function on a 
fisheries management aspect, not diversifying into economic fields, especially in 
cases where TURFs are given to communities or organizations whose membership is 
open to any fishers. They must avoid any rules of exclusivity within their own 
territory. Otherwise, the operation of FOs will cause social conflicts in fishing 
communities. Given the conditions where coastal fisheries still provide plenty of 
employment opportunities, any policy for coastal fisheries management will hardly 
bring a sense of hopelessness to fishers.
Cooperative organizations engaged in economic activities tend to adopt "scale 
of economy"-based principles in business operation under relaxation and structural 
adjustment of the national economy. These principles are not always acceptable by 
FOs with a management function in coastal fisheries. Organization and operation 
principles that the cooperative organizations currently prevailing adopt are more 
suitable to the enhancing of the market-oriented ability of members. There may be 
still the recommendation that FOs are to feature both economic unity and a 
management body. Probably, this has derived from unique experiences gained in 
Japanese fisheries cooperatives. In actuality, they have successfully developed an 
interlocking relationship between market-oriented and fisheries management 
functions. Such a relationship is, however, a very sophisticated arrangement based on 
customary fishing behavior. It will take time for Thai small-scale fishers to organize 
FOs in the same manner. In this sense, the promotion policy for GFFs is rational to 
some extent.
According to past experiences, very few cooperative organizations could 
avoid severe competition among members and between themselves and non­
members. A particular class of members often made a monopoly of cooperative
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benefits. Any system and rule of FOs must be under democratic control. In Thai rural 
society, local powers and elite can more easily access development benefits than 
others, by taking the initiatives in the decision-making process of village 
administrations. Without an institutional framework of democratic control in FOs, 
coastal fisheries resources may again be monopolized by a minority group of fishers. 
FOs have to develop a democratic structure of organization and operation. This must 
be strictly guided by central and local governments. New regimes such as co­
management and community-based fisheries management cannot tolerate arbitrary 
fishing behavior of minority groups. The ideal and practical procedures of 
cooperative organizations are built into the new regimes. Essential elements of 
cooperative principles are self-reliance, equality and democratic control. They 
become the elements of the new regimes in coastal fisheries management.
5. Conclusions
It seems that co-management and community-based management regimes 
reduce severe competition among small-scale fisheries which in turn reduces the 
depletion of coastal fisheries resources. Locally-based and formal institutional 
frameworks have to develop resource users' participation in the decision-making 
process of fisheries management. A cooperative system is applicable to these new 
frameworks. At the outset, the principle of organization and operation in the system 
will adopt the communal elements newly created which exclude a rigidly structured 
relationship in fishing communities. Probably, this is only a transitional stage of 
coastal fisheries management.
In Thailand, structural changes have occurred in fishing communities and 
fisheries-based industries. In developed areas, some of small-scale fishers have 
become mature enough to conduct highly commercialized fisheries, while residents 
tend to migrate to urban centers to obtain jobs outside fisheries. Fishing becomes one 
of the alternative employment opportunities. In the future, a locally-based 
management system may consist of an assembly of units of individual fishers with the 
possession of particular fishing rights such as an individual transferable quota. 
Naturally, the principle of operation and organization that a cooperative system 
adopts will be modified into that of particular occupational groups, diminishing the 
communal elements. It is attuned to the importance of economic efficiency in 
individual fisheries. As shown in the case of some developing countries, territorial 
use rights in fishing would be given to any fishers organizations that are competent to 
effectively use the resources and to preserve them. This is possibly one direction of a 
cooperative resource management through economic efficiency.
For the establishment of effective coastal fisheries management, FOs will 
pass through phased stages of development. Clearly, Thai small-scale fishers have to 
create and develop their own models of FOs. There will be a wide variety of models 
according to different patterns of small-scale fisheries development at local levels. 
Comparative case studies on the ongoing pilot projects will provide an insight into
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what viable model of FOs will be more useful not only for people's participation and 
but also for sustainable use of coastal fisheries resources.
(Notes)
1 Department of Cooperative Promotion has the authority to register and supervise 
fisheries cooperatives. This department covers all types of cooperatives.
2 They are called as fishermen's groups. They are not registered according to the 
Cooperative Society Act. The Department of Fisheries regulates groups. There is 
much difference between fisheries cooperatives and groups.
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